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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF PHYSICAL
CAPACITY TO MARRY
I INEVITABLY in the course of the present revaluation of
our laws and of the basis of our judicial thinking and
institutions, the law affecting marriage must be critically
examined. The nature of the relationship between husband
and wife, the object of that relationship, the capacities which
each must bring to it, and the rights and obligations of each
to the other, must be factually examined in order that the law
applied to them may be in keeping with their requirements.
Any consideration of the physical capacity for marriage
must first ascertain what the legal ends and objects of matri-
mony are. Such a survey of ends must of necessity present
the same difficulty which is to be found in the analysis of any
universal institution. Time, place and mores, to say nothing
of the possible combinations of human motives, present us
with countless ends. The law cannot, of course, in specific
terms provide therefor. What can be done is to provide a
minimum requirement, in accordance with the particular cus-
tom and ideology of the country. A ready perception of the
difficulties in establishing a universal rule may be grasped
from the fact that, in this country, each of our states differs
in its requirements for divorce, ranging in extreme from
South Carolina, where no divorce obtains, to Nevada, which
has tended to become the national safety-valve through which
those too much pent up in their home jurisdictions may
escape.
The common law countries seem, however, to have agreed
upon two objects of matrimony, which may be enforced. One
of those is the procreation of children and the protection of
the family, and the second is that of indulgence of the sexual
passions. Whether those ends have been met by the law as
applied will be discussed hereinafter. To some extent, it
would appear that the courts have set a rhetorical standard
which has not been lived up to in the application of the law
to litigated causes.
Lord Penzancel said, "* * without sexual intercourse,
'G. v. G. Law Rep., 2 P. & M. 287, 291.
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the ends of marriage-the procreation of children, and
the pleasures and enjoyments of matrimony- cannot be at-
tained." Just as Lord Penzance placed first the procreation
of children, so Ayliff said, "As the first cause and reason of
matrimony ought to be the design of having progeny * * *. 2
Similar statements have been made by the courts in this
country in Turner v. Avery3 and in Wendel v. Wendel.4
In Turner v. Avery, Chancellor Walker, discussing the
observation by Lord Penzance, quoted above, that procreation
of children is one of the prime ends of marriage, said, "I do
not hesitate to say that it is the most important object of
matrimony, for without it, the human race itself would per-
ish from the earth." 5
In England, in the leading case of D-e v. A-g,6
Dr. Lushington said, "* * * without that power, neither of
two principal ends of matrimony can be attained, namely, a
lawful indulgence of the passions to prevent licentiousness,
and the procreation of children according to the evident
design of divine Providence."
Recently, our Court of Appeals, in the case of Mirizio
v. Mirizio, said:
"However much this relationship may be debased
at times, it nevertheless is the foundation upon which
must rest the perpetuation of society and civilization.
If it is not to be maintained, we have the alternatives
either of no children or of illegitimate children, and
the State abhors either result. The mere fact that the
law provides that physical incapacity for sexual rela-
tionship shall be ground for annulling a marriage is
of itself a sufficient indication of the public policy that
such relationship shall exist with the result and for
the purpose of begetting offspring."17
It may be taken then that one of the principal legal
ends of marriage is the procreation of children and the pro-
-' Ayl. Parer, 360.
'Turner v. Avery, 92 N. J. Eq. 473, 113 Atl. 710 (1921).
'Wendel v. Wendel, 30 App. Div. 447, 52 N. Y. Supp. 72 (2nd Dept., 1898).
'SSupra Note 3.
'D--e v. A--g, 1 Rob. Eccl. 279, at 294 (1845).
'Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N. Y. 74, 150 N. E. 605 (1926), opinion per
Hiscock, Chief Justice.
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tection of the home. What then is the minimum requirement
set by the law for the physical attainment of that object?
What, in the last analysis, is the least which the law exacts
of those who would marry, and, what is more important,
what does the law set as the maximum of that which those
who marry may expect of the spouse? Are the physical
requirements of the law such as meet the expectation, or does
the law as applied frustrate the desires of whose who may
marry with the object in view of bearing and rearing chil-
dren? In this jurisdiction, the requirements with regard to
physical capacity are set forth in the Domestic Relations
Law:
"VOIDABLE MARRIAGES.-A marriage is void from
the time its nullity is declared by a court of competent
jurisdiction if either party thereto:
(3) Is incapable of entering into the married
state from physical cause;"' 8
The statute, as at present written, is substantially a re-
enactment of the original Domestic Relations Law of 1896.
The Revised Statutes of 1828,9 headed "Divorces on Ground
of the Nullity of the Marriage Contract," provided that the
Chancellor may, by the sentence of nullity, declare void the
marriage contract upon the ground, among others, that one
of the parties was physically incapable of entering into the
marriage state. Section 7 of the Domestic Relations Law,
which we have quoted, also provides, "That actions to annul
a void or voidable marriage may be brought only as provided
in the civil practice act and rules of civil practice."
The Civil Practice Act, section 1141, provides:
"AcTION TO ANNUL A MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND
OF PHYSICAL INCAPACITY. An action to annul a mar-
riage on the ground that one of the parties was physi-
cally incapable of entering into the marriage state may
be maintained by the injured party against the party
whose incapacity is alleged; or such an action may be
8Dom. Rel. L.. sec. 7.
2 R. S. 144, pt. 2, ch. 8, art 3, tit. 1.
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maintained by the party who was incapable against
the other party, provided the incapable party was un-
aware of the incapacity at the time of marriage, or
if aware of such incapacity, did not know it was
incurable."
It is in the construction of the words "physical incapa-
city" and several expressions thereof in the statutes that we
believe the courts have erred. The language of the statute
"physically incapable" and "incapable * * * from physical
cause," and in the Practice Act, "physically incapable of
entering into the marriage state," permitted several con-
structions. The courts had open to them to say that physical
incapacity was one of three things: one, incapacity to pro-
create children; two, incapacity to indulge the passions; and,
three, incapacity to both indulge the passions and to pro-
create children. Upon the construction made by them much
depended. Although the cases in which such construction
might be of actual application are few, the influence upon
society of a public policy with regard to the capacity to
marry is great. Whether the law holds that the object of
marriage is merely for the indulgence of passion, or that its
object is lawful procreation of children and the protection of
the family, might indicate the course of society.
Was marriage to be held to be merely an institution to
prevent unlawful fornication and to minimize adulterous
intercourse, and other such negative purposes (all of which
have been given as reasons by courts in considering the ques-
tion), or were the statutes to be interpreted affirmatively as
giving a positive function to marriage? Was the object of
marriage merely to prevent crime and unlawful intercourse,
by making it possible for mere intercourse to be lawful? The
answers to questions such as these, though given in but a few
cases, nevertheless filter through and help to form the man-
ners and morals of our social life. Declarations such as these
are more than judgments in causes. They are the statements
of public policy which determine the conduct of our adult
population. It is the far-reaching effect of such decisions
which makes their discussion valuable.
From the language of Hiscock, J., in Mirizio v. Mirizio,
to the effect that:
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"The mere fact that the law provides that physi-
cal incapacity for sexual relationship shall be ground
for annulling a marriage is of itself a sufficient indi-
cation of the public policy that such relationship shall
exist with the result and for the purpose of begetting
offspring,"10
One might well gather that the provision of the law concern-
ing physical incapacity for sexual relationship had bepn con-
strued consistently with the declared public policy that such
relationship shall exist for the purpose, and with the result,
of begetting offspring. Such, however, is not the case. The
first reported case in this jurisdiction, Devanbagh v. Devan-
bagh,11 arose under the Revised Statutes of 1828. In his
opinion, the Chancellor said:
"When the Legislature conferred this branch of
its jurisdiction upon the Court of Chancery it was not
intended to adopt a different principle from that
which had theretofore existed in England, and indeed
in all Christian countries, as to the nature and extent
of the physical incapacity which would deprive one of
the parties of the power to contract matrimony." 12.a
And, after citing Brown v. Brown 1" and Weld v. Weld, 14
among others, discussed the question of impotence and said,
"** mere sterility can, in no case, form a sufficient ground
for a decree of nullity." This case has since achieved author-
ity and has, in fact, been accepted in other jurisdictions as
laying down the so-called American Doctrine.15 Close scru-
tiny of the language used by the Court is, therefore. justified.
It may be doubted that the statement of the Court "that these
principles had theretofore existed in all Christian countries"
was true. Bishop, in his work on "Marriage and Divorce,""
"0 Supra Note 7.
" Devanbagh v. Devanbagh, 5 Paige 554 (N. Y., 1836).,
" Supra Note 9.
'a Supra Note 11.
" Brown v. Brown, 1 Hagg. Eccl. Rep. 523 (1828).
"Weld v. Weld, 2 Lee's Eccl. Ca. 580 (1731).
" Anonymous 89 Ala. 291. 7 So. 100 (1890).
" 1 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce (6th ed., 1881). Book III. ch. XX,
sec. 325.
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casts some doubt on it and indicates quite clearly that in
Scotland, at least, the burden of the cases was the inability
to beget children and that in those countries in which the
Canon Law had force, the inability to procreate was regarded
as impotence sufficient to warrant the annulling of a mar-
riage. He quotes from Fraser, who says:
"The 98th Constitution of Leo, the philosopher,
expresses at great length the utter abhorrence of the
emperor at the doctrine that the potentia copulandi
without the power of procreating children was suffi-
cient. The most eminent commentators on the Canon
Law are of the same opinion. Brower argues the point
with great warmth holding as his leading principle,
that marriage is not instituted for the satisfying of
lust, or the exciting of passion but the begetting of
children." 17
In passing, although it does not contradict the remark
that such was the law in Christian countries, it may be
pointed out that under the ancient Hebraic Law, the pro-
creation of children was regarded as the principal object of
marriage. So much so, that the power to declare a marriage
null and void where sterility existed was taken away from
the parties and given to the courts, so that a marriage which
had been childless for ten years might be annulled, the par-
ties unwilling.1 8
In considering the effect of Devanbagh v. Devanbagh,18a
it should further be noted that neither of the two Eng-
lish cases, cited by the Court would serve as authority
for the statement that mere sterility could in no case form
a sufficient ground for a decree of nullity. In Brown v.
Brown,19 in judgment by Sir John Nicholl, he said, "Mrs.
Brown was past the age of child bearing at the time of the
marriage: therefore the primary and most legitimate object
of wedlock, the procreation of issue, could not operate; and a
1 I Fraser Dom. Rel. (2nd ed., 1876), p. 85.
"Moses Mielziner, The Jewish Law of Marriage and the State (1884),
p. 125.
"a Supra Note 11.
"o Supra Note 13.
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man of sixty who marries a woman of fifty-two should be
content to take her tanquanv soror." It is obvious that this
judgment of Sir John Nicholl was not to the effect that pro-
creation in marriage was not a prime object thereof and that
the incapacity therefor was not a sufficient cause in law to
invalidate it, but rather that because of the age of the parties
that object did not operate. Quite to the contrary, the opin-
ion would indicate that, as a general rule, the inability to
procreate would operate as an inducing cause to invalidate
marriage, but because of the exceptional circumstances, i.e.,
the age of the parties, the general rule could not be applied.
By its dependence upon the exceptional circumstances of the
parties, the opinion is to be construed as laying down an
entire opposite rule to that adopted by the Chancellor in
Devanbagh v. Devanbagh. 19a
So, also, the second case cited by the Chancellor, Weld
v. Weld,20 was decided on a question of consummation and
triennial cohabitation. The question of sterility was not
before the Court and was not adjudicated.
Furthermore, this statement by the Chancellor was mere
dictum, as the issue in the Devanbagh case was whether or
not the Court would annul a marriage on the ground of
impotence, where there is a probability of capacity and
where the testimony shows that there is good reason to believe
that the disability may be removed by a slight surgical oper-
ation. Nevertheless, this dictum became the leading case in
what is known as the American Doctrine, to the effect that
what the Court called "mere sterility" is not a sufficient cause
for the annulment of a marriage. The law thus said to those
living under it, that while it is true that the object of matri-
mony is to beget children, yet the inability so to beget is not
an inability which disqualifies for marriage. This paradox
has led the courts on to say that the impotence recognized by
the law is impotence which would prevent the indulgence of
the sexual passions.
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"The meaning of the words 'physically incapaci-
tated,' as here used, is substantially the same as that
of the word 'impotent,' frequently met with in divorce
proceedings. It means powerless, or wanting in physi-
cal power, to consummate the marriage. Animal de-
sire between the sexes is one of the incitements to
matrimony, the lawful gratification of which is encour-
aged and protected alike by moral sentiment and mu-
nicipal regulation. Copulation or coition-the act of
gratifying sexual desire, is the consummation of mar-
riage, inability to accomplish which, when it pro-
ceeds from incurable physical imperfection, or mal-
formation is precisely what our statute means and
expresses by the words 'physically and incurably
incapacitated.' 1121
This legal attitude toward marriage, which cannot help
but be repulsive to all those who think in terms of marriage
as being an institution wherein children may be lawfully
begotten and reared, has been accepted by the courts in this
state, as is seen from Schroter v. Schroter22 and Wendel v.
Wendel 2 3
In the Wendel case, at special term,24 the Court did not
consider the effect of Devanbagh v. Devanbagh,2 4a but it anal-
yzed, to some extent, the decision in D-e v. A-g.2 b The
Court said:
"Other text writers equally recognize the protec-
tion of the family as one of the great objects of mar-
riage, but most of them, so far as I have been able to
discover, have fallen into the error of regarding the
decision of Deane v. Aveling, 1 Rob. Ecc. 279, as estab-
lishing the contrary principle."
The Court then points out that what was said by Dr. Lush-
ington in that case was mere dictum, and concludes his
argument on the subject, saying:
'Supra Note 15.
-- Schroter v. Schroter, 56 Misc. 69, 106 N. Y. Supp. 22 (1907).
'Supra Note 4.
Wendel v. Wendel, 22 Misc. 152, 49 N. Y. Supp. 375 (1897).4
a Supra Note 11.
-b Supra Note 6.
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"The reasoning of Dr. Lushington in Deane v. Ave-
ling is not satisfactory, and the case not being author-
ity on the question at issue here, I hold that within
the meaning of our statute, a person destitute of child-
bearing organs is physically incapable of the chief and
higher purpose of matrimony and consequently, of
entering the marriage state."
On appeal to the appellate division, the judgment of the
Court below was reversed. The appellate division said, with
regard thereto:
"The Court held that because of the loss of her
ovaries, the defendant was incapable of conception,
and, therefore, of entering into the marriage state.
While this conclusion is in harmony with those higher
ideals of the marriage state, which ought not to be
disturbed except upon grave consideration of public
policy, we are forced to conclude that the learned trial
Court has not fully considered the effect of such a rule
and that it ought not to receive the sanction of this
court."
and said further:
"It seems to us clear, therefore, that it cannot be
held as a matter of law that the possession of the
organs necessary to conception are essential to en-
trance to the marriage state, so long as there is no
impediment to the indulgence of the passions incident
to this state."
After quoting the dictum in the Devanbagh case, that mere
sterility can in no case form a sufficient ground for a decree
of nullity, the Court said:
"While the policy of the law undoubtedly contem-
plates the possibility and the probability of issue, it
cannot be held as a matter of law that the physical
incapacity to conceive is a bar to entering the mar-
riage state."
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The measure of impotence has, therefore, been estab-
lished to be ability to indulge in the sexual passions, not the
ability to procreate. 25
The attempt by a judge, at special term, to apply as a
test for capacity the ability to procreate, that being a test of
capacity for what the Court felt was the chief and higher
purpose of marriage, was reversed, and, in the course of that
reversal, the Court indicated that in the decided cases in this
jurisdiction, public policy required that marriages be an-
nulled only in cases where the impotence created no possibil-
ity of sexual indulgence. Between such a public policy and
the public policy which must have been the intention of the
Court of Appeals, in the Mirizio case, there is an utter
cleavage. That cleavage must, in the practical application of
the law by the courts, be resolved. The spread between the
ideal and the fact must be lessened. It is not enough that the
courts should state that the ideals of marriage are the pro-
creation of children and the protection of the home. There
must also be harmonious practice.
That practice need not of necessity present difficulties
due to exceptional cases. While it is true that people marry-
ing after the first flush of youth may marry for reasons other
than the begetting of progeny, and while it is equally true
that the circumstances of particular marriages may indicate
their specific objects and ends, nevertheless both by statute
and judicial decision, such exceptions may be recognized and
provision made therefor. There is authority for this course
in the immediate field. Brown v. Brown 2 5a was such a case, as
likewise was Hatch v. Hatch. 26
'Griffith v. Griffith, 162 Ill. 368, 44 N. E. 820 (1896) ; Payne v. Payne, 46
Minn. 467. 49 N. W. 230 (1891); Kirschbaum v. Kirschbaum, 92 N. J. Eq. 7,
111 Atl. 697 (1921) ; Turner v. Avery, supra Note 3; Deitch v. Deitch, 162 App.
Div. 25, 146 N. Y. Supp. 1019 (2nd Dept., 1914), aff'd 213 N. Y. 708, 108
N. E. 1092 (1915); Riley v. Riley, 73 Hun 575, 26 N. Y. Supp. 164 (1893);
Gore v. Gore. 103 App. Div. 168, 93 N. Y. Supp. 396 (3rd Dept., 1905) ; Geis
v. Geis, 116 App. Div. 362, 101 N. Y. Supp. 845 (1st Dept., 1906); McNair v.
McNair, 140 App. Div. 226, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1 (2nd Dept., 1910); Cohn v.
Cohn, 21 Misc. 506, 48 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1897) ; Schroter v. Schroter (1907),
supra Note 22; Hatch v. Hatch, 58 Misc. 54, 10 N. Y. Supp. 18 (1908.);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 69 Misc. 489, 126 N. Y. Supp. 149 (1910) ; Anony-
mous, 158 N. Y. Supp. 51 (1916) ; Elser v. Elser, 160 N. Y. Supp. 724 (1916) ;
Hule v. Hule, 166 N. Y. Supp. 615 (1917); VandenBerg v. VandenBerg, 197
N. Y. Supp. 641 (1923).
aSupra Note 19.
' Hatch v. Hatch, supra Note 25.
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In Hatch v. Hatch, Judge Pound said:
"The courts decline to grant annulment for physi-
cal incapacity where, by reason of the advanced years
of the parties at the time of the marriage, the desire
for support and companionship, rather than the usual
motives of marriage, must have actuated them. 19 Am.
& Eng. Ency. of Law (2nd ed.), 1169."
And, in Wendel v. Wendel, similar conclusions were indi-
cated, where by reason of an operation procreation had
become impossible, the Court pointing out that no essential
difference existed between incapacity caused by an operation
and incapacity caused by the passage of time.
That a statute providing for annulment nmay be drawn in
such form so as to leave discretion in the Court to enable it
to take into consideration particular circumstances, is evi-
dent when one considers the amendment to paragraph 1 of
section 7 of the Domestic Relations Law, providing for annul-
ment for nonage. That statute was amended in 1922, to read:
"Sec. 7. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES.
1. Is under the age of legal consent, which is
eighteen years, provided that such nonage shall not of
itself constitute an absolute right to the annulment of
such marriage, but such annulment shall be in the dis-
cretion of the court which shall take into considera-
tion all the facts and circumstances surrounding such
marriage."
A statute providing that the measure of incapacity
should be that which prevents the procreation of children
and yet which would leave to the sound judicial discretion
of the court, decision in the light of the surrounding facts
and circumstances, would be forward-looking and would
bring our law determining legal capacity to marry in line
with the high public policy declared by the Court of Appeals.
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